In May 2026, I wrote an open letter to Prime Minister Narendra Modi after the “Cockroach Janta Party” meme swept through social media. The immediate trigger was a judicial observation, but the reaction revealed something deeper: a generation accustomed to digital speed expressing frustration with institutions that can still make citizens wait, plead and feel powerless.
The erosion of institutional confidence deserves serious attention.
That anger should not be dismissed as another passing internet trend. It is a warning that trust in the judiciary, bureaucracy and everyday machinery of government can erode rapidly. It is also an opportunity to reform before frustration hardens into permanent alienation.
Two recent interventions have brought this question back into focus.
Captain Amarinder Singh, writing in The Indian Express, has argued that “Modi-ism” must evolve from leader-centred mobilisation into institution-centred nation-building. He acknowledges the gains of the Modi years but argues that they now require deeper institutional foundations. Parliament must deliberate seriously, appointments to constitutional bodies must inspire confidence, federal consultation must precede decisions affecting states, and the BJP must build institutional depth beyond one personality.
His point deserves attention. He is a visionary, and when he speaks, people listen.
Even if the driver is excellent, the vehicle must also be sound. Its tyres need alignment, its engine needs regular servicing and its systems cannot be expected to run indefinitely without maintenance.
Manish Tewari, writing in The Tribune a day earlier, makes a more direct argument. He points to declining parliamentary sittings, poorly functioning state assemblies, judicial vacancies, crores of pending cases and inadequate devolution of power to local institutions. His conclusion is stark: the institutional balance is weakening, and public confidence is paying the price.
Both arguments matter. But India’s institutional weaknesses are no longer merely a constitutional concern. They have become an economic constraint.
The 1991 reforms released Indian industry from much of the licence-permit raj. Private enterprise gained greater freedom to invest, compete, innovate and export. Agriculture, however, was largely left outside that transformation.
As I have argued previously, the factory owner received greater freedom while the farmer remained a controlled supplier of cheap food. Prime Minister Modi showed an intent to address this with the agricultural reforms of 2020, but that initiative ultimately failed.
Farmers can produce, but their access to markets remains vulnerable to policy intervention. Export restrictions can appear when prices rise. Imports can be opened when domestic prices increase. Stock limits can discourage investment in warehousing and value chains. The Commission for Agricultural Costs and Prices must balance farmers’ interests against consumer prices and inflation. The National Food Security Act creates a legitimate obligation to provide affordable food, while procurement requirements influence the broader pricing system.
We call the farmer annadata while often using his economic strength to sustain the food-subsidy system.
Economist Surjit Bhalla has made a similar argument, noting that practically every major sector underwent reform in 1991 except agriculture. In some respects, he has argued, agriculture experienced “negative reform”. He has also linked weak private investment to policy uncertainty, restrictive investment rules, retrospective taxation, bureaucratic risk aversion and the absence of sustained structural reform.
China offers a revealing contrast. Its reform process began in rural areas, where agricultural households received greater responsibility, production incentives and decision-making freedom before reforms expanded into industry, foreign trade and investment.
China did not become an economic power merely by building roads and factories. It repeatedly changed the rules and incentives governing economic activity.
Reform is never comfortable. Vested interests oppose it because they feel threatened and see their territory being encroached upon. A department may regard a single-window authority as an intrusion into its jurisdiction. An official may view change as a threat to his “other income”. Even a well-meaning officer may prefer refusing a decision to taking the risk of approving one.
That is why reform cannot simply mean launching another portal or passing another law. The old ecosystem can survive inside the new structure. Files may become digital, but objections can remain analogue. A single window may be created while departmental walls remain firmly intact.
Investor concerns also deserve attention, although they need to be stated accurately. An August 2026 Bank of America survey ranked India as the least-preferred Asia-Pacific equity market, excluding Japan, replacing Indonesia at the bottom. Thirty-two per cent of fund managers surveyed were underweight India, while concerns over the pace of reforms had increased. Weak growth, limited exposure to the artificial-intelligence boom and high valuations were among other factors.
At the same time, gross FDI reached a record $94.5 billion in 2025-26, while net FDI stood at only $7.7 billion. Foreign capital has alternatives. India cannot assume that its population and market size will indefinitely persuade investors to tolerate regulatory uncertainty, delays or slow dispute resolution.
This makes stable and predictable tax reform particularly important. Investors need rules that are consistent rather than subject to abrupt or arbitrary changes.
India’s economic vehicle needs to move at considerably greater speed if it is to reach the Viksit Bharat 2047 destination. Yet institutional speed governors remain in place. Judicial pendency, bureaucratic discretion, regulatory uncertainty and sectoral protectionism repeatedly slow the economy.
The engine built in 1947 needs an overhaul. The vehicle needs new tyres, properly aligned and balanced for the expressways being built under Union Minister Nitin Gadkari.
At the present pace, Viksit Bharat 2047 risks becoming a destination reached long after its scheduled arrival.
India therefore needs a second generation of reforms.
Judicial appointments and vacancies require transparent timelines. The backlog of cases must be reduced, while case management should curb endless adjournments. Commercial disputes need speed and predictability. Civil servants should be assessed on outcomes, innovation and timely decision-making, rather than merely on their ability to avoid controversy.
Parliament and state assemblies must recover their deliberative role. Federal consultation should become routine rather than ceremonial.
Agricultural reform must give farmers greater market access and choice while providing income protection, risk cover and a credible transition mechanism. Those genuinely disadvantaged by reform deserve support. But those who merely lose a monopoly, commission or discretionary power cannot be allowed to veto the future.
Strong leadership and strong institutions are not competing ideas. Leadership creates momentum; institutions preserve it and carry it beyond an individual or a government.
Captain Amarinder Singh is right that India’s present political energy must mature into institution-building. Manish Tewari is right that institutional deterioration is already visible. Surjit Bhalla is right that six per cent growth, however respectable, will not by itself deliver the ambition of 2047.
Reform will be difficult. It will generate anxiety, resistance and political opposition. But postponing reform risks investment, competitiveness, jobs and, most importantly, the confidence of India’s youth.
History offers enough warnings of what happens when institutional pressure is allowed to accumulate unchecked. The Tiananmen Square events of 1989 remain one such reminder.
Wise nations reform before pressure becomes crisis.
India still has that opportunity. The political potholes have also created an opportunity to repair the road. The engine is powerful, the destination is clear and the driver has political authority.
It is time to reset the speed governor and release the handbrake held by a pre-Independence-era mindset.
Feedback and comments mann.gurpartap@gmail.com
- Gurpartap Singh Mann is a farmer and former Member of the Punjab Public Service Commission. He has earlier served as Chief General Manager, Punjab Infrastructure Development Board.
- An Engineer and MBA by qualification, he writes on governance, agriculture, and socio-political issues concerning Punjab.
He was earlier Spokesperson of Punjab Congress and founder Chairman of its Social Media Cell. - His father, S. Bhupinder Singh Mann, former Member of the Rajya Sabha, is a prominent Kisan leader and founder of the Bharti Kisan Union in Punjab and All India Kisan Coordination Committee at National Level.
The views expressed in this article are solely those of the author. They do not necessarily represent the views or editorial position of YesPunjab.com, which accepts no responsibility for the opinions expressed herein.
August 22, 2026
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