Islamabad, November 10, 2026 (Yes Punjab News)
Saudi Arabia’s defence partnership with Turkey and Pakistan is facing its first major test, exposing the limits of a security arrangement that promises collective defence but does not commit either ally to offensive military operations, according to an analysis by Mahmud Bin Morshad and Muhammad Atta Annus.
The Mecca Joint Defence Agreement, announced in August 2026, was presented as a NATO-style collective security framework under which an attack on one member would be treated as an attack on all. However, both Ankara and Islamabad have made it clear that their involvement will remain defensive rather than extend to fighting Saudi Arabia’s offensive battles.
Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan described the agreement as “defensive, not offensive”, saying Turkey would not send forces into another country’s territory to launch an attack. Defence Minister Yasar Guler also ruled out Turkish troops entering a conflict with the Houthis.
Turkey’s contribution is expected to focus on military technology, air-defence systems, drone operators and intelligence-sharing. Ankara is also seeking to deepen defence-industrial cooperation with Riyadh, building on its major defence export agreement involving Akinci combat drones.
Pakistan has deployed approximately 8,000 troops to Saudi Arabia, along with a squadron of JF-17 fighter jets and a Chinese HQ-9 air-defence system. However, these forces are officially assigned advisory and training responsibilities. Islamabad has ruled out offensive ground operations against the Houthis, maintaining a position similar to its refusal to join the Saudi-led military intervention in Yemen in 2015.
The analysis identifies Pakistan’s geographical, domestic and military constraints as major reasons behind this position. Pakistan shares a porous 900-kilometre border with Iran, and cross-border missile strikes between the two countries in early 2024 highlighted the vulnerability of that frontier. An offensive operation against the Houthis, described in the analysis as Iran’s key regional proxy, could further strain relations with Tehran and create security challenges in Balochistan.
Domestic considerations are equally significant. Pakistan has the world’s second-largest Shia population, estimated at 10 to 15 per cent of its population. Direct involvement in a sectarian conflict in the Middle East could trigger serious internal tensions. Its military priorities also remain centred on maintaining deterrence along the eastern border with India.
Turkey’s reluctance to participate in offensive operations is driven by its own strategic interests. Ankara relies on Iranian natural gas, with Iran accounting for approximately 13 per cent of Turkey’s gas imports in 2025, according to the analysis. Turkey also needs coordination with Tehran in northern Iraq and Syria to contain Kurdish militant groups.
The authors further argue that an attack on the Houthis could undermine Turkey’s regional standing, given its leadership’s vocal support for the Palestinian cause and the Houthis’ portrayal of their operations as resistance against Western and Israeli interests.
Economic considerations reinforce the defensive approach, particularly for Pakistan. Saudi Arabia holds around $8 billion in deposits at the State Bank of Pakistan and extended its $5 billion financial facility to a three-year arrangement running until December 2028. Pakistan is also implementing a $7 billion International Monetary Fund programme.
Remittances from Pakistani workers in Saudi Arabia are another major factor. According to figures cited in the analysis, Pakistani workers sent home a record $41.6 billion during the 2026 financial year, with Saudi Arabia contributing $9.78 billion. Protecting the Pakistani workforce and critical Saudi infrastructure is therefore a priority for Islamabad.
Energy security also shapes Pakistan’s calculations. The analysis says the effective closure of the Strait of Hormuz in early 2026 pushed the country’s weekly oil import bill from $300 million to $800 million. With much of Saudi crude reaching international markets through the Red Sea, protecting shipping routes is in Pakistan’s direct economic interest. An escalation against the Houthis could invite further retaliation and increase energy costs.
For Turkey, defence exports and industrial cooperation with Saudi Arabia are central to the partnership. Turkish defence exports reportedly rose from $7.15 billion in 2024 to around $10 billion in 2025 and reached $11.2 billion over the 12 months to mid-2026. Cooperation with Riyadh includes discussions on the KAAN fighter programme and a proposed arrangement for assembling Gokbey helicopters in Saudi Arabia.
The analysis also points to Turkey’s economic vulnerabilities, including high inflation, elevated interest rates, rising energy costs and declining exports to the Gulf. Regional instability could further affect its tourism sector, which generated a record $65 billion in 2025.
Saudi Arabia itself faces financial pressures, with a reported budget deficit of approximately SAR 244 billion in the first nine months of 2026 and public debt rising to around $473 billion. The authors argue that protecting infrastructure and strengthening deterrence would be more economical than pursuing a prolonged offensive campaign.
The analysis concludes that the Mecca agreement’s defensive character reflects the strategic and economic interests of all three countries. Pakistan and Turkey are prepared to protect Saudi infrastructure, airspace and strategic assets, but neither is willing to risk its domestic stability, relations with Iran or economic interests by entering an offensive war against the Houthis.
The views expressed in the analysis are those of its authors, Mahmud Bin Morshad, Program Officer at the Department of Political Science and Sociology, North South University, Bangladesh, and Muhammad Atta Annus, researcher and economics student at the National University of Sciences and Technology, Pakistan.
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